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Abstract
A prediction market is a useful means of aggregating information about a future
event. To function, the market needs a trusted entity who will verify the true out-
come in the end. Motivated by the recent introduction of decentralized prediction
markets, we introduce a mechanism that allows for the outcome to be determined
by the votes of a group of arbiters who may themselves hold stakes in the market.
Despite the potential conflict of interest, we derive conditions under which we can
incentivize arbiters to vote truthfully by using funds raised from market fees to
implement a peer prediction mechanism. Finally, we investigate what parameter
values could be used in a real-world implementation of our mechanism.
1 Introduction
Prediction markets are commonly used to elicit information about some future event.
The market operates by allowing participants to buy and sell securities which pay off
according to the outcome of the event, and participants with an informational edge are
able to place profitable trades when the market price disagrees with their own forecast.
Through this trading process, the market price can be construed as a consensus fore-
cast of the underlying event probability. Prediction markets have proven effective at
forecasting events in a variety of domains, including business and politics (Spann and
Skiera, 2003; Berg and Rietz, 2006).
A key challenge in implementing and scaling prediction markets is the question of
outcome determination (i.e., closing markets for events). Traditional prediction mar-
kets are centralized, in the sense that there exists a trusted center that creates markets,
oversees transactions, and closes the market appropriately. The trusted center is a bot-
tleneck for defining and closing markets, limiting the scope of what can be predicted.
However, there has recently been a rise of interest in decentralized prediction markets,
where any user may create a market for an event. The markets are closed by consensus
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among a group of arbiters rather than by a center.
A decentralized platform removes the requirement for a highly trusted center, but
it also allows each arbiter to directly influence the outcome of the market, in much
the same way that agents may deliberately manipulate an event due to their own stake
in the market; this is known as outcome manipulation (Shi, Conitzer, and Guo, 2009;
Berg and Rietz, 2006; Chakraborty and Das, 2016). Additionally, by allowing anyone
to create a market, there is no longer any guarantee that all questions will be sensible,
or even have a well-defined outcome. In this paper, we propose a specific prediction
market mechanism with crowdsourced outcome determination that addresses several
challenges faced by decentralized markets of this sort.
First is the issue of outcome ambiguity. At the time the market closes, it might be
unreasonable to assign a binary value to the event outcome due to lack of clarity in the
outcome. In a centralized market, it may be possible to postpone the market closing date
to allow for rare cases of ambiguity, but it is not clear who should make such decisions
in a decentralized marketplace. Therefore, it may be more fitting to allow outcomes to
be non-binary, reflecting some level of disagreement. Outcomes in our mechanism are
determined by the fraction of arbiters that report an event to have occurred. This also
guarantees that every market is well-defined, by having traders explicitly trade on their
expectations of the arbiter reports, not the actual event.
Second is the problem of peer prediction. For the credibility of the market, it is
essential that arbiters are incentivized to truthfully report their opinion as to the realized
outcome. If, for instance, we reward arbiters for agreeing with the majority opinion,
then they are forced to anticipate the reports of other arbiters, not their independent
opinion. We address this problem by making a technical change to an existing peer
prediction mechanism, the 1/prior mechanism.
Third is the inherent conflict of interest that arises by combining prediction markets
and peer prediction mechanisms. Even if arbiters can be incentivized to report truthfully
in isolation, there is no way to prevent them also having a stake in the market. An arbiter
holding securities that pay off in a particular event will be incentivized to report that
the event has occurred, even if they do not genuinely believe it to be the case, as long as
they have a chance of affecting the market outcome. We tackle this issue by charging
a trading fee that is later used to pay the arbiters. We show that, as long as each agent
is responsible for a limited fraction of trading, and questions are clear enough, realistic
trading fees can fully subsidize truthful reporting on the part of the arbiters.
Related Work. This work is inspired by decentralized prediction markets based on
crypto-currencies, including Truthcoin, Gnosis, and especially Augur (Peterson and
Krug, 2015). As in Augur, our mechanism consists of a prediction market stage and
an arbitration stage, with trading fees from the market stage subsidizing the arbitra-
tion. The details of the mechanisms differ in both stages, however, and Augur includes
additional layers of complexity such as a reputation system. While this complexity
does provide additional protection against attack, Peterson and Krug do not obtain any
theoretical guarantees or justification for their chosen parameters. Clark et al. also dis-
cuss outcome determination in crypto-based prediction markets, among several other
implementation aspects.
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Our work is most closely related to that of Chakraborty and Das (2016), who con-
sider a model where two agents participate in a prediction market whose outcome is
determined by a vote among the two agents. Our model extends theirs by allowing
an arbitrary number of traders, and not requiring that all traders are arbiters. Further,
we take a mechanism design approach, obtaining an incentive compatible mechanism,
while Chakraborty and Das focus on analyzing the equilibrium of a simple (to play)
trading-voting game, with no peer prediction mechanism in the voting phase to incen-
tivize truthful voting. Recent work by Witkowski et al. (2017) also looks at a combina-
tion of forecasting and peer prediction, although the forecasts in their paper are elicited
via proper scoring rules, rather than prediction markets.
The work of Bacon et al. (2012) is similar in spirit to ours, as is the literature on out-
come manipulation mentioned previously, but in all cases the concrete setting is quite
different. We also draw heavily on existing literature in prediction markets (Hanson,
2003; Chen and Pennock, 2007; Chen and Vaughan, 2010) and peer prediction (Miller,
Resnick, and Zeckhauser, 2005; Prelec, 2004; Witkowski and Parkes, 2012); Chen and
Pennock (2010) survey these topics.
2 Preliminaries
LetN be a set of agents and letA ⊂ N be a small set of distinct and verifiable arbiters.
Letm = |A| denote the number of arbiters. The agents are anonymous in the sense that
one cannot verify whether a trade is placed by an arbiter or non-arbiter, and whether
several trades are placed by the same agent. LetX be a binary event with some realized
outcome in {0, 1}. We are interested in setting up a prediction market for the outcome
of X , with the resolution of the market decided upon by the arbiters.
Prediction markets. We consider prediction markets implemented via a Market
Scoring Rule (MSR), where the underlying scoring rule is strictly proper (Hanson,
2003; Chen and Pennock, 2007). Every strictly proper MSR can be implemented as
a market maker based on a convex cost function. Under this market structure, agents
trade shares of a security with a centralized market maker, who commits to quoting a
buy and sell price for the security at any time. The security payout is contingent on the
outcome of X . In the usual implementation, one share of the security pays out $1 in
the event that X = 1, and $0 otherwise.
Let q denote the total number of outstanding shares owned by the agents (note
that q can be negative, in the case that more shares have been sold than bought). The
market maker charges trades according to a convex, differentiable, and monotonically
increasing function C. An agent wishing to buy q′ − q securities pays C(q′) − C(q).
Negative payments encode a transaction where securities are sold back to the market
maker. The instantaneous price of the security is given by p = dCdq . Because the market
maker always commits to trading, it may run a loss once the outcome is realized and
the securities pay out, but the loss is bounded.
In practice, the cost function is also tuned using a liquidity parameter b, via the
transformation Cb(q) ≡ bC(q/b). A higher setting of b results in lower price respon-
siveness, in the sense that the price will change less for a fixed dollar trading amount.
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It also results in a higher worst-case loss bound for the market maker. Unless otherwise
stated, our results assume that each agent participates in the market only once. The
mechanism and results extend to situations in which agents can participate more than
once, and we highlight these extensions where relevant throughout the paper.
Peer prediction. Peer prediction mechanisms are designed to truthfully elicit private
information from a pool of agents via a reward structure that takes advantage of in-
formation correlation across agents. After the realization of X , each arbiter i receives
either a positive or negative signal xi, which we denote by xi = 1 and xi = 0 respec-
tively. Let µ be the prior probability that an agent receives a positive signal. Let µ1
(resp. µ0) be the probability that, given agent i receives a positive (resp. negative) sig-
nal, another randomly chosen agent also receives a positive signal.1 In a standard peer
prediction belief model, the quantities µ1 and µ0 can be calculated given µ and the
signal beliefs P (xi = 1|X = 1) and P (xi = 1|X = 0); Witkowski (2014) provides
an overview. Assuming common information is not always reasonable, but it is natural
in our setting to assume that agents take the closing price of the prediction market as
their prior (if not, then they can profit in expectation by participating in the market).
The probabilities µ1 and µ0 are specific to the nature of the event X .
The peer prediction mechanism of interest in this work is the 1/prior (“one over
prior”) mechanism (Witkowski, 2014; Jurca and Faltings, 2008, 2011). The 1/prior
mechanism first asks each agent for their signal report xˆi. Then, every agent i is ran-
domly paired with a peer agent j 6= i, and paid
u(xˆi, xˆj) =

kµ if xˆi = xˆj = 0
k(1− µ) if xˆi = xˆj = 1
0 if xˆi 6= xˆj ,
where k is some positive constant that can be freely adjusted to scale the payments
received by the arbiters. Truthfully reporting xˆi = xi is an equilibrium provided that
µ1 ≥ µ ≥ µ0 (Frongillo and Witkowski, 2016). This is a natural condition that we will
assume throughout the paper—receiving signal xi = 1 should not decrease i’s estimate
that another agent j also receives signal xˆj = 1. We also assume that at least one of the
inequalities is strict, so that µ1 > µ0; this condition is known as stochastic relevance.
Via a simple adaptation of the corresponding proof for the 1/prior mechanism, it can
be shown that truthful reporting remains an equilibrium if µ is replaced by some other
constant c with µ0 < c < µ1 in the payments; we will exploit this fact to adapt the
1/prior mechanism for our purpose.
We call the quantity δ = µ1−µ0 the update strength. This quantity is specific to the
instance and, roughly speaking, measures how strongly positively correlated the signals
are across arbiters. The update strength is high if, after receiving a positive (negative)
signal, an arbiter believes that another given arbiter receives a positive (negative) signal
with high probability. For instance, if event X is “Will the Cleveland Cavaliers win
1Our analysis will assume that µ1 and µ0 are common across agents, but this is not a strict requirement.
If we allow each agent to have distinct updates µi1, µ
i
0, then we can let µ1 = mini µ
i
1, corresponding to the
minimum update given xˆi = 1, and similarly µ0 = maxi µi0.
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1. Market stage.
(a) A prediction market is set up for an event X using a market scoring
rule.
(b) Agents trade in the market. For a security bought at price p, a trading
fee of fp is charged, and for a security sold at price p, a fee of f(1−p)
is charged.
(c) The market closes, trading stops.
2. Arbitration stage.
(a) Each arbiter i receives a signal xi ∈ {0, 1} and reports an outcome
xˆi ∈ {0, 1}.
(b) Each arbiter i is assigned a peer arbiter j 6= i and paid according to
the 1/prior with midpoint mechanism.
(c) The outcome of the market, and the payoff of each share sold, is set to
the fraction of arbiters that report xˆi = 1.
Figure 1: Prediction market with outcome determined using peer prediction.
the 2016 NBA playoffs?” then we would expect δ ≈ 1, since any arbiter reaching a
conclusion about the outcome of the series (by watching it live, reading in the news,
etc.) would strongly expect any other arbiter to reach the same conclusion. On the other
hand, a question like “Will a Presidential candidate tell a lie in the televised debate?”
is considerably more open to interpretation, and we would expect it to have a smaller
value of δ. If an arbiter believes a candidate to have lied, it is not necessarily the case
that another arbiter believes the same.
3 Mechanism
A step by step description of our mechanism is given in Figure 1. The mechanism runs
a prediction market where the outcome is determined by a vote among arbiters. The
arbiters’ signals should be interpreted as the information they receive regarding the
outcome of X: checking news sources, observing events, their own opinions, etc. To
ensure that arbiters truthfully report their information, we incentivize them via a peer
prediction mechanism.2 In both stages we implement non-standard versions of existing
mechanisms, which we detail in the following.
2Each arbiter makes his report without knowledge of the report of any other arbiter; for instance, the
reports could be made simultaneously.
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Market stage
We make use of an MSR with non-binary outcome. The outcome takes a value
Xˆ ∈ [0, 1] corresponding to the fraction of arbiters that report xˆi = 1. Each share
sold pays off Xˆ . Observe that this fundamentally changes the value of a security to a
market participant: in a standard prediction market, an agent’s value for a security is his
subjective probability that event X occurs, while in our market his value is the fraction
of arbiters that he expects to report xˆi = 1. However, given the agent’s valuation for
a security, his incentives in both markets are similar. A risk-neutral, non-arbiter agent
will trade shares until the market price matches the security’s expected payoff, or the
agent’s budget is exhausted.
This change to the payoff structure has two advantages. First, it ensures that any
question has a well-defined and unambiguous outcome, avoiding problems with badly
worded questions. This is important in any situation where users are allowed to generate
markets. Second, any market with a binary outcome that relies on arbitration must have
a point of ‘discontinuity’, where a change in report from a single arbiter results in the
value of a security changing by $1.3 There will therefore always be situations where,
given the reports of the other arbiters, a single arbiter completely controls the market
outcome. If this arbiter also has a significant stake in the market, this creates a very
large incentive problem. By utilizing non-binary outcomes, a single arbiter can only
change the value of each security by at most $1/m.
Our mechanism imposes trading fees. Theoretical models of prediction markets
do not typically incorporate trading fees (an exception is the work of Othman et al.,
where a fee in the form of a bid-ask spread is used to allow liquidity to increase over
time), but they are standard in real-world implementations. To understand how the fee
is implemented, it is important to distinguish between transactions (buy or sell) where
an agent increases its position (in terms of risk), and transactions where it liquidates its
position. The trading fee that we implement can be seen as a fee on the worst-case loss
incurred by an agent: the fee is on p when a new security is bought, and 1 − p when
a security is sold short (because it may pay out $1). However, no fee is levied when
an agent sells back a share that it holds, or buys back a share that was previously sold
short—these are liquidation transactions.
The trading fee serves two distinct purposes in our mechanism. First, it allows us to
raise funds which can then be used to pay arbiters. Even assuming that arbiters behave
honestly (in the absence of a sophisticated peer prediction mechanism), they still need
to be compensated for the time spent looking up the outcome of X and reporting it to
the mechanism. This can, in principle, be achieved by any of a number of fee structures.
Second, the fee provides natural bounds on the value of any given security. Even
if an event is certain to occur, with a fee of f = 2% an agent who moves the market
price to (say) 99¢ actually pays a marginal cost of $0.99 · 1.02 > $1 (see Lemma 2
for an exact bound). The multiplicative fee effectively bounds the price of the security
away from 0 and 1. Thus, it is impossible for an agent to buy securities at an arbitrarily
cheap price, which allows us to bound the number of securities, and therefore maximum
payout, of any agent with a fixed budget B. We note that there are other reasonable fee
3To see this, consider the case where all arbiters report xˆi = 1, and flip one report at a time to xˆi = 0.
One of these flips must change the outcome from Xˆ = 1 to Xˆ = 0.
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structures which do not provide such a lower bound on the price. For example, if the
agents only pay a fee on any profit they gain from the market, then the price of an event
that is certain to happen will still converge to 1.
Arbitration stage
The main challenge in our setting is to incentivize arbiters to truthfully report their
signal regarding the realized value of X . In the absence of any conflict of interest, this
is a simple peer prediction problem. Since the closing price of the market gives us a
natural common prior on the probability that a given arbiter receives signal xi = 1,
it is natural to use the 1/prior mechanism. For prior signal probability µ, the 1/prior
mechanism uses the fact that µ1 ≥ µ ≥ µ0 to guarantee that truthful reporting achieves
higher payoff than misreporting. However, as µ1 approaches µ, the payoff for truthfully
reporting signal xˆi = 1 approaches the payoff for misreporting xˆi = 0. In isolation,
there is still no reason to misreport, but if the arbiter has some stake in the market then
it may be worthwhile to incur a small misreporting loss to achieve other gains. The
following example illustrates this issue.
Example 1. Consider a prediction market for the event “Will the Democratic presi-
dential candidate be leading the Republican presidential candidate in the polls at the
end of the month?” Suppose it is known that 10% of arbiters only check conservative
news sources, which always report that the Republican candidate is ahead, and an-
other 10% only check liberal news sources, which always report the opposite. Suppose
the market closes at µ = 0.89. Consider an arbiter j who checks a (moderate) news
source and finds that the Democratic candidate is ahead (i.e., xj = 1). Since it is still
the case that 10% of the arbiters will certainly receive signal xi = 0, the updated belief
µ1 remains no higher than 0.9. That is, the update is very small, and the expected profit
from reporting xˆj = 1 is also small. If j has bet against the outcome (i.e., sold some
securities to the market maker), it could be in his interest to lie and report xˆj = 0.
However, if the moderate news site had reported that the Republican candidate
was leading (i.e., xˆj = 0), the updated belief µ0 could be quite small, even in the
range of 0.1 (since most arbiters check moderate sources). Now j has a lot to gain
from reporting xˆj = 0. Therefore, j would have to hold a relatively large number of
shares for misreporting to outweigh the expected profit from the 1/prior mechanism.
Example 1 stems from an asymmetry in update strength, leading to potentially dif-
ferent incentives for arbiters depending on which signal they receive. We modify the
mechanism, making the update strength symmetric. Given that we know the updated
beliefs µ1 and µ0, we can pay arbiters according to the 1/prior mechanism but use
the value (µ1 + µ0)/2 instead of the prior, µ. We call this the 1/prior with midpoint
mechanism. Using the midpoint guarantees that the incentives for arbiters are the same
regardless of the signal they receive. For the arbiter with the greatest incentive to mis-
report, using the 1/prior with midpoint mechanism (weakly) decreases his incentive to
misreport over the standard 1/prior mechanism, allowing us to achieve better bounds in
our worst-case analysis.
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Analysis
In this section, we derive conditions for truthful reporting (xˆi = xi) to be a best re-
sponse, given that all other arbiters report truthfully. The main restriction we require is
an upper bound B on the total budget any given arbiter spends in the market—without
such a bound, an arbiter could have an arbitrarily large incentive to manipulate the
market’s outcome. Thus, B appears as a parameter in our analysis.
Arguably, an arbiter confident in their ability to manipulate a market outcome could
procure enough funds as to have a very large budget, especially relative to a small
market. However, in current decentralized prediction markets, each arbiter arbitrates
only a small fraction of markets. As long as the assignment of arbiters to markets
is done after the market closes, there is no way for manipulators to target a specific
market. For this reason, we believe that manipulations are most likely to be of a form
where arbiters participate honestly in the first stage, but, if they happen to be assigned
to arbitrate a market that they also participated in, may be able to gain by not reporting
truthfully, rather than arbiters mounting deliberate high-budget attacks in the market
stage. Of course, our analysis is not specific to that particular interpretation, but we do
consider it a compelling argument in favor of using a budget bound in our analysis.
Intuitively, we need to scale the payments made to arbiters in the arbitration stage
by a sufficiently large k so that the increased payoff for truthful reporting in this stage
overwhelms the gains from manipulating the outcome.
Lemma 1. Let ni be the number of securities held by arbiter i. Then truthfully re-
porting xˆi = xi is a best response for arbiter i, given that all other arbiters report
truthfully, if and only if
k ≥ 2|ni|
mδ
.
Proof. We prove the case where ni > 0; the case for ni < 0 is symmetric. The total
payoff for arbiter i is the sum of the payoffs from the market phase and the arbitration
phase. Fixing the reports of the other arbiters, the market payout for i is higher when i
reports xˆi = 1. And, in expectation, the payoff for i in the arbitration phase is higher
for truthful reporting than for lying. Thus, the only problematic case is when xi = 0,
but i may wish to report xˆi = 1.
So suppose that xi = 0. The expected payoff for truthfully reporting xˆi = 0,
assuming all other arbiters truthfully report their signal, is
niµ0
m− 1
m
+ (1− µ0)k µ0 + µ1
2
. (1)
Here µ0(m − 1) is the expected number of arbiters that report signal 1, and therefore
niµ0(m − 1)/m is i’s expected payoff from the market, while the remaining term is
1 − µ0, the probability of i’s peer agent also reporting 0, multiplied by the payment i
receives in this case. On the other hand, the expected payoff for misreporting xˆi = 1 is
ni
(
µ0
m− 1
m
+
1
m
)
+ µ0 k
(
1− µ0 + µ1
2
)
, (2)
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where the extra 1/m in the first term is due to the additional market payoff from i
reporting xˆi = 1, and the latter term is now the probability of i’s peer agent reporting
1, multiplied by the payoff i receives when this happens.
We require that the expected payoff for reporting xˆi = 1 be at most the expected
payoff for truthfully reporting xˆi = 0. Setting term (2) to be at most term (1) and
simplifying yields the result.
This characterization requires an upper bound on the number of securities that any sin-
gle agent owns. In itself this is an unsatisfying restriction; however, we can think about
it in terms of the size of the fee, f , and the amount of money that any single arbiter
spends in the market, B. For fixed fee f , let q− and q+ be the number of outstanding
securities such that the market prices are p(q−) = f/(1 + f) and p(q+) = 1/(1 + f)
respectively. Note that these quantities depend on the liquidity parameter b used in the
cost function.
Lemma 2. For fixed percentage fee f , the number of outstanding securities lies in the
interval [q−, q+].
Proof. Suppose that some agent sells a security when there are already q− outstanding.
Then the marginal price is exactly f/(1 + f). When selling a security at this price, the
agent receives f/(1 + f) from the mechanism but must pay a trading fee of
f
(
1− f
1 + f
)
=
f
1 + f
.
Thus the agent’s net revenue from the sale is 0 (and the possibility remains that he must
pay the mechanism in the event that X occurs). Therefore no agent makes such a sale,
and the number of outstanding securities never drops below q−.
A similar argument shows that q never exceeds q+. To buy a security when there
are already q+ outstanding, an agent must pay a price of at least $1, when the fee is
included.
Lemma 2 provides us with the minimum and maximum number of outstanding se-
curities at any time. As a corollary, we can derive the maximum number of secu-
rities that a single agent with budget B is able to purchase or short sell. We inter-
pret the budget as an upper bound on the worst-case loss that the agent is able to
incur. When buying a security for price p, the worst-case loss is p, under outcome
X = 0. When selling a security for price p, the worst-case loss is 1 − p, under
outcome X = 1. Let φ+b (B) = C
−1
b (B + Cb(q
−)) − q−. Define q′ implicitly by
B + Cb(q
+)− Cb(q′) = q+ − q′, and let φ−b (B) = q′ − q+.
Corollary 1. At the end of the market stage, an agent i with budget B holds ni ∈
[φ−b (B), φ
+
b (B)] securities.
Proof. We first show the upper bound. Given an existing number of outstanding secu-
rities, q, an agent is able to increase the number of outstanding securities to q′, where
Cb(q
′)− Cb(q) = B. (3)
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For a fixed budget, the maximum number of securities that can be bought in a single
transaction is in the case that q is as small as possible; in our case, q = q−. Substituting
into (3) gives
q′ = C−1b (B + Cb(q
−)).
The number of securities held by i is q′ − q = q′ − q−, which gives the upper bound
in the statement of the corollary.
We now show the lower bound. Given an existing number of securities q, an agent
is able to decrease the number of outstanding securities to q′, where
B + Cb(q)− Cb(q′) = q − q′. (4)
The right hand side of (4) is the number of securities sold by the agent to the mecha-
nism, and therefore the amount that he may be required to pay the mechanism in the
case that X = 1. The left hand side is exactly the funds that the agent is able to use
to reimburse the mechanism: his budget, B, plus the amount paid to the agent by the
mechanism for the securities, C(q) − C(q′). The maximum number of securities that
can be sold in a single transaction is in the case that q = q+; making this substitution
in (4) yields the implicit formula for q′ in the definition of φ−b (B). The number of se-
curities sold by i is q′ − q = q′ − q+, which gives the lower bound in the statement of
the corollary.
An interesting special case is the limit as b → ∞. This corresponds to the market
having zero price responsiveness, meaning that all securities are purchased at a fixed
price. Conceptually, it is equivalent to the situation where agents participate in the mar-
ket more than once. In that setting, an agent could wait until the market price reaches
f
1+f , buy a small number of securities, then wait again until the price drops. An agent
spending all their budget in this way can, in the extreme case, buy as if the market has
infinite liquidity.
Corollary 2. For an agent that spends at most B dollars in a market with trading fee
f and infinite liquidity, ni lies in the range
[
−B(1+f)f , B(1+f)f
]
.
Proof. The minimum price for a single security is f1+f , by Lemma 2 and the definition
of q−. Therefore, an agent with budget B can buy at most B(1+f)f , the upper bound in
the corollary statement.
The maximum price for a single security is 11+f , by Lemma 2 and the definition
of q+. Thus, an agent selling a security has worst case loss at least 1 − 11+f = f1+f .
So, an agent with budget B can sell at most B(1+f)f securities, which yields the lower
bound.
If every agent has budget at most B in the market stage, we can combine the bounds
from Corollaries 1 and 2 and Lemma 1 to determine the minimum payment that guar-
antees truthful reporting in the arbitration phase.
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Theorem 1. Given that all other arbiters report truthfully, truthful reporting is a best
response for arbiter i if
k ≥ 2max{|φ
−
b (B)|, |φ+b (B)|}
mδ
.
In the case that agents may participate in the market many times, truthful reporting
requires that
k ≥ 2B(1 + f)
fmδ
.
Proof. The theorem follows directly from substituting the lower bound on ni from
Corollary 1 and Corollary 2 into the inequality from Lemma 1.
Therefore, fixing an agent budget B and a trading fee f , we know how large one needs
to make the payments in the arbitration phase in order to incentivize truthful reporting.
We now take a global view, and examine the total funds required to incentivize all
arbiters to report truthfully.
Lemma 3. The total payment made to the arbiters is at most mk. We can implement a
truthful equilibrium with total payment at most
2max{|φ−b (B)|, |φ+b (B)|}
δ
.
In the case that agents may participate in the market many times, we require total
payment at most
2B(1 + f)
fδ
.
Proof. As 0 ≤ µ0, µ1 ≤ 1, their mean also lies between 0 and 1, and therefore each
arbiter’s payment in the 1/prior with midpoint mechanism is at most k. Thus the total
payment to the arbiters is at most mk, which proves the first part. Combining this with
the bounds on k from Theorem 1 yields the second part.
Now that we have an expression for the total amount needed to pay the arbiters, we
can determine a suitable value for the fee f so that the mechanism does not need any
outside subsidy to finance these payments. Let ci denote the total cost paid by agent i
to the mechanism (so ci is negative if agent i sells securities). Define M by
M =
∑
i:ni>0
ci +
∑
i:ni<0
(ni + ci).
M can be interpreted as the sum of the worst-case losses of the agents. By definition,
the total fee revenue collected by the mechanism is fM . The mechanism is guaranteed
to generate enough fees to incentivize truthful reporting if the revenue is at least as
large as the total payment required for the arbiters. We state this result as a theorem.
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(a) Multiple entry case. (b) Single entry case.
Figure 2: Minimum fee f required to adequately incentivize arbiters, plotted as a func-
tion of BM . In both cases,M = 10
6 is fixed. Relationships are shown for selected values
of update strength δ and, in the right-hand plot, liquidity b.
Theorem 2. The mechanism generates enough fee revenue to pay the arbiters without
requiring any outside subsidy if
fM ≥ 2max{|φ
−
b (B)|, |φ+b (B)|}
δ
. (5)
If agents may participate in the market many times, then we require that
fM ≥ 2B(1 + f)
fδ
. (6)
Observe that inequality (6) aligns with intuition. An increase in total trader spendM , or
the trading fee f , makes it easier to incentivize the arbiters to report truthfully since the
market collects more revenue. Likewise, an increase in δ helps us satisfy the inequality,
since a large update strength increases the incentive for arbiters to report truthfully
to the peer prediction mechanism. However, a large value of B increases the stake
that any single arbiter can have in the market, which in turn increases their payoff for
misreporting.
An interesting feature of inequalities (5) and (6) is the lack of any dependence on
the number of arbiters m. One might expect that increasing the number of arbiters
would be beneficial, since this reduces the influence that any one of them has on the
market outcome. However, this is canceled out by the fact that as we add arbiters, the
payment per arbiter decreases, so that we cannot incentivize them as strongly.
4 Parameter Calibration
In this section we investigate the constraints imposed by inequalities (5) and (6). The
purpose of the exercise is to illustrate how Theorem 2 can be used to inform the choice
of fee f , and to confirm that realistic fees could be charged in practice to subsidize
truthful arbitration. We consider the logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR), which is
the most common MSR used in practice. For the LMSR, the cost and price functions
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are
Cb(q) = b log(1 + e
q/b), p(q) =
eq/b
1 + eq/b
.
By the symmetry of LMSR, q− = −q+ and φ−b (B) = −φ+b (B). We will therefore
solve for φ+b (B). To find q
−, we set p(q) = f/(1 + f) and solve for q, which gives
q− = b log f . Now, substituting the relevant components into the expression φ+b (B) =
C−1b (B + Cb(q
−))− q− leads to the following expression for inequality (5):
fM ≥ 2b(log((1 + f)e
B/b − 1)− log f)
δ
. (7)
In the case where we allow agents to participate multiple times, inequality (6) remains
unchanged.
We plot (5) and (6) in Figure 2, considering their tight versions as equalities. First
consider Figure 2a, which represents the worst-case scenario in which agents can enter
multiple times and potentially spend their entire budget buying securities at minimum
price p−. Suppose that some entity is creating a prediction market for event X . Having
decided on a question, the main decision is what value to set for f , typically in the 2-
5% range. To do so, the market creator needs to first estimate a value for δ, which will
be determined by question clarity, whether the arbiters have reliable sources to check
the outcome, and other such factors. Each line in the graph represents a specific value
of δ. With δ fixed, the market creator can estimate a value for BM . This is the maximum
proportion of money that any single arbiter will contribute to the market. We would
expect BM to be small for markets that generate a lot of interest, while niche markets
would be vulnerable to having a single agent contribute a large percentage of the total
trade. Given these values, the creator can arrive at the smallest f that is guaranteed
to subsidize truthful reporting. From the graph, we see that in the case of a question
where δ = 1 and BM = 0.001, we can subsidize the arbiter payment with a fee of
approximately 4%. This may seem large for a clear question with high participation,
but we stress that this fee is based on a severe worst case where an agent is able to
spend its entire budget purchasing securities at the minimum price.
Now consider Figure 2b, which returns to the case where an agent only enters once,
where liquidity now plays a role and we have to consider different values for parameter
b. Figure 2b includes two reasonable values for b, as well as three different values for δ.
We note that the situation looks considerably better for the market creator; indeed, the
horizontal axis is now ten times larger indicating that we can now handle much smaller
markets. When δ = 1, we can handle situations where a single agent can contribute
as much as 2% of the total trade with a fee of less than 5%. Even for questions with
δ as low as 0.3, in a market with b = 1000 and BM = 0.005 the fee can be set to
approximately 5%.
5 Conclusion
This paper proposed and analyzed a mechanism where the outcome of an MSR pre-
diction market is determined via a peer prediction mechanism among a set of arbiters.
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The mechanism relies on two key adaptations to incentivize truthful arbitration: market
shares pay out according to the proportion of arbiters who vote affirmatively, instead
of a binary payout, and peer prediction payments are based on the midpoint of the
two possible posteriors, rather than the prior. We showed that, with this combination
of adaptations, it is possible to charge a trading fee that fully subsidizes truthful arbi-
tration. Calibration based on plausible values of question clarity and trading volume
suggests that realistic fees of 5% should be sufficient in practice.
While we have derived conditions under which truthful reporting is an equilibrium,
there remains the possibility of the arbiters reporting according to uninformative equi-
libria that achieve higher payoff. This problem has recently been addressed in the peer
prediction literature in situations where reporters complete several tasks instead of just
one (Dasgupta and Ghosh, 2013; Shnayder et al., 2016); it may be worthwhile to ap-
ply these techniques to our setting. In practice, arbiters vote on many questions across
time, which opens the possibility of using a reputation system to incentivize them to
vote truthfully and accurately (Peterson and Krug, 2015). The interplay of the incen-
tives from all these mechanisms is fertile ground for future research.
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